Abu Dhabi talks are planned for November, but no date has been fixed.
Zelenskyy forecast in July three-way negotiations with the United States and Russia this autumn, and the Kremlin undertook on October 21 to resume them. On October 28 Zelenskyy said he hoped the round would meet between November 6 and 10, but Washington had not confirmed a date and the Kremlin had set no timeline. No session has convened since February. Both are scored on whether delegations of all three governments meet by the end of November.
Latvia’s defence minister undertook in August to cover the entire border with Russia and Belarus with Latvian-made counter-drone equipment by the end of September. Neither the defence ministry nor the armed forces has confirmed full coverage.
The November 3 vote now tests more official undertakings. In a sworn declaration, the Justice Department said its election monitors will carry no firearms and will only observe and take notes. After a federal judge barred Homeland Security officers in nine states from targeting likely citizens, the department said it has no plans to question people it believes to be citizens. Forecasters’ final calls on both chambers will be scored against certified results.
Every entry below is a falsifiable claim captured verbatim in one of Wholestory's topics, scored when its due date arrives. Wholestory publishes no forecasts of its own, and this board reflects the sample of the conversation our research cycles capture — not the whole conversation.
The board in numbers
Updated Oct 29
Theme
Open
Due
Resolved
Returns on AI capital
23
0
1
Geopolitics and war
20
1
1
Warming trajectory
15
0
5
Elections
11
0
0
Infrastructure impact
9
0
1
Official conduct
9
0
0
Jobs
9
0
0
Capability milestones
6
0
1
Energy transition
4
0
1
Emissions pledges
1
0
2
Regulation and law
3
0
0
Safety incidents
1
0
1
Compute prices
2
0
0
National advantage
2
0
0
Adoption
1
0
1
Total claims
131
Kind
99 forecast · 32 commitment
Due, awaiting verdict
1
Next due
Nov 17, 2026 (official conduct) · Nov 17, 2026 (official conduct) · Nov 17, 2026 (official conduct) · Nov 17, 2026 (official conduct) · Nov 17, 2026 (official conduct)
The claims
131
Newresolves by Jan 3, 2027
Democrats are also favorites to win the Senate. They need a net gain of four seats, and our current projection is a Democratic gain of three and five seats, but our projections could change before the election.
Party controlling the Senate when the 120th Congress convenes, and its seat count, per senate.gov — Democrats (with the independents who caucus with them) against 50–52 seats, a gain of three to five on 47; scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md (seat-count call, threshold 1 seat; named winner = Democrats).
As of this point, we are thinking the Democrats have the inside track to a Senate majority, albeit narrowly at 51 or 52 seats. But these races are all close, and we want to take in all of the final information before pushing the remaining Toss-ups.
Party controlling the Senate when the 120th Congress convenes, and its seat count, per senate.gov — Democrats (with the independents who caucus with them) against 51–52 seats; scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md (seat-count call, threshold 1 seat; named winner = Democrats).
Democrats are clear favorites to win the House majority. Our current range is a Democratic gain of 10 to 20 seats, which is entirely above the three seats they need to gain for a majority.
Democratic House seats when the 120th Congress convenes, per the Clerk of the House’s member list, against 225–235 — a gain of 10 to 20 on the 215 implied by the forecaster’s own statement that three more make a majority of 218; scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md (seat-count call, threshold 5 seats; named winner = Democrats).
Democratic House seats when the 120th Congress convenes, per the Clerk of the House’s member list, against 227–237 — a gain of 12 to 22 on the 215 implied by Cook’s reported need of three for a majority of 218; scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md (seat-count call, threshold 5 seats; named winner = Democrats).
Whether, between 22 October 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026, Homeland Security officers questioned or investigated a person the department then believed to be a U.S. citizen in connection with a voter-citizenship inquiry, as established by a court finding, a DHS or inspector-general record, or a state or county election official on the record.
As with all monitors, those employees are prohibited from having any firearms with them, and they are prohibited from undertaking any action while monitoring other than normal (Civil Rights Division) monitoring conduct such as observing the polling place and taking notes on their observations.
Whether any Justice Department election monitor, between the start of voting and the close of polls on 3 November 2026, carried a firearm or did anything at a polling place beyond observing and taking notes (for example questioning voters inside, handling ballots or equipment, or directing officials), as established by a court record, a state or county election official on the record, or independent reporting from at least two outlets.
Whether ICE or other federal immigration officers conducted a sweep of a polling place — an operation at or directed at a polling place to find people suspected of being in the country unlawfully, as distinct from the arrest of one specific person — between 13 September 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026, as established by a court record, a state or county election official on the record, or independent reporting from at least two outlets.
Our latest Global Seasonal Climate Update forecasts that sea surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific – the epicentre of El Niño - may rise to 3.8°C above average during November 2026 to January 2027.
November 2026–January 2027 three-month Niño 3.4 sea-surface temperature anomaly as reported by WMO's El Niño/La Niña Update (cross-checked against NOAA CPC): 'may rise to 3.8°C' read charitably as reaching +3.5°C or more. Only data for NDJ 2026–27 counts.
Through 2030, AI data center owners would need to generate a cumulative $8.5 trillion in revenue to cover announced capital spending, financing costs, and a 12% return on invested capital (ROIC), which we assume to be the hurdle rate of investment capital. However, total enterprise and consumer AI revenue that can be attributed to AI data centers during this period is forecast to reach no more than $3.6 trillion.
Cumulative 2026–2030 enterprise and consumer AI revenue attributable to AI data centres, against Gartner's ceiling of $3.6 trillion (and the $8.5 trillion it says is needed), as measured by Gartner or comparable industry tallies published after 2030
OpenAI’s annualised revenue run rate for December 2026, counted as OpenAI books it (net of partners’ shares), as disclosed in a filed prospectus or periodic report or, failing that, as reported by at least two independent outlets; holds if at least $70 billion
SpaceX’s annual recurring or annualised revenue at the end of 2027, as stated in its filed results for the fourth quarter of 2027 (or its 2027 annual report); holds if at least $500 billion
Our President informed Steve Witkoff that, in principle, Russia is ready to resume the trilateral talks around the 10th of November to discuss the main issue. This concerns the establishment of a security system for Russia and Ukraine after the end of the conflict.
Whether a negotiating session with official delegations from Russia, Ukraine and the United States convenes between 2026-10-22 and 2026-11-30, as reported by two independent wire chains or confirmed by any of the three governments. Sessions before 2026-10-22 do not count.
I have just concluded a highly successful discussion with President Vladimir Putin, of Russia, wherein it was agreed that Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace, another 500,000 Tons during the month of November, and 1,000,000 Tons immediately thereafter
Russian diesel shipped to world markets after 9 October 2026, from loading or ship-tracking data (LSEG, Kpler, the IEA, or loadings reported by Reuters or Bloomberg): at least 300,000 tonnes loaded between 9 October and 31 October 2026, and at least 500,000 tonnes loaded in November 2026. Only shipments after the statement count; both thresholds must be met.
“Grid power has always been our preferred long-term solution, and we appreciate Supervisor Saines' leadership in bringing stakeholders and Dominion Energy together toward continued partnership in developing a solution to bridge utility power to the campus by the end of 2028, more than a decade earlier than previously projected, while maintaining system reliability.”
Utility power reaches Vantage’s VA2 Sterling campus and its on-site gas turbines are removed, per Loudoun County, Dominion or Virginia regulatory records
The only reason why we would be at polling places is if there is a threat to that polling place or we're serving a warrant on someone that we have been actively tracking down. ICE's job is immigration, customs enforcement. That's their job … if we're serving a warrant we will be where we need to be.
Whether ICE officers were present at a polling place between 1 September 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026 for any purpose other than responding to a threat to that polling place or serving a warrant on a specific person, as established by a court record, a state or county election official on the record, or independent reporting from at least two outlets.
We have an election crimes community coordinator in all 56 field offices, so you bet we're going to have them there and manning the posts for election interference.
Whether each of the FBI's 56 field offices had a designated election-crimes coordinator on duty for the 3 November 2026 election, as established by an FBI or Justice Department statement or document, or independent reporting, published between 15 September and 17 November 2026.
If small models improve at their historical rate, they'll match this capability level by the end of this year. Small weight-based replicators may be possible soon after.
Between 12 October and 31 December 2026, an open-weight model of 30 billion parameters or fewer reaches or exceeds GLM-5.2's score on Epoch AI's published Epoch Capabilities Index. Only models released after 12 October 2026 count.
Whether 2026 global solar generation AND 2026 global wind generation each exceed 2026 global nuclear generation, per Ember / Energy Institute full-year data.
Russia’s Rassvet satellite network could soon let Russia steer Shaheds, reconnaissance drones and cheap missiles such as Banderol and Dan-M by satellite in real time, getting around Ukraine’s jamming; satellite passes already give 30–40 minute windows, and full coverage is about six months away. “For me, this is danger No. 1 among the technological challenges Russia poses to us right now.”
Whether Ukrainian Air Force reporting or a specialist analytical assessment documents Russian one-way attack drones or missiles being controlled in real time over the Rassvet satellite network with continuous coverage of Ukraine, between 16 October 2026 and 16 April 2027
Of the 13 House seats Axios counts Republican-drawn 2025–26 maps as drawn to gain, the number Republicans win at the 3 November 2026 general election, per each state’s certified results; the claim holds if that number is below 13. Scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md.
For the next two decades, a warming of about 0.2°C per decade is projected for a range of SRES emission scenarios. Even if the concentrations of all greenhouse gases and aerosols had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of about 0.1°C per decade would be expected.
Under the IPCC Business-as-Usual (Scenario A) emissions... a rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century of about 0.3°C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0.5°C per decade); this is greater than that seen over the past 10,000 years.
The central estimate ran high: warming since 1990 has averaged about 0.2°C per decade, at the bottom of the stated 0.2–0.5 range and roughly a third below the 0.3 central. The First Assessment Report overestimated the 1970–2016 warming rate by about 17% because its business-as-usual case assumed faster CO₂ and halocarbon growth than occurred — but observed warming stayed inside its stated range (Carbon Brief/Hausfather).
Decided by
Observed global mean surface temperature trend per decade from 1990 across the major records, against the FAR's 0.3°C/decade central estimate and its 0.2–0.5°C/decade range.
For the mid-range IPCC emission scenario, IS92a, the model-projected global mean warming is about 2°C by 2100. This estimate is approximately one third lower than the “best estimate” in 1990.
Global mean surface warming by 2100 under mid-range (IS92a) emissions against the SAR's ~2°C best estimate; interim check = observed 1990-onward warming rate vs the SAR's projected rate.
The globally averaged surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C (Figure 5d) over the period 1990 to 2100. These results are for the full range of 35 SRES scenarios, based on a number of climate models.
Observed global mean surface temperature in 2100 relative to 1990 across the major records against the stated 1.4–5.8°C; interim: the observed warming rate from 1990 against 0.13–0.53°C per decade.
The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 will likely be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence).
The observed 2016–2035 mean global surface temperature minus the 1986–2005 mean, across the major surface records (HadCRUT5, NOAA, GISTEMP, Berkeley Earth, ERA5).
Global surface temperature will continue to increase until at least mid-century under all emissions scenarios considered. Global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century unless deep reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades.
The 20-year mean global surface temperature for 2021–2040 relative to 1850–1900, across the major records, against Table SPM.1’s best estimate of 1.5°C (very likely 1.2–1.8°C under SSP2-4.5); and whether 1.5°C is exceeded during the century absent deep reductions.
This is going to be the biggest DOJ election observer effort in history. And I’m so excited to be leading that effort. … They’re not going to be interfering in any way or running the election, they’re going to be observing, making notes.
Whether any Justice Department election monitor interfered with voting or with the conduct of the election at a polling place or election office between 14 October 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026 — by directing voters or poll workers, handling ballots or equipment, or being removed by election officials for disruption — as established by a court record, a state or county election official on the record, or independent reporting from at least two outlets.
I’m very confident that we’re going to take back the majority, but it remains to be seen what that looks like in terms of the number of seats that we pick up, which is going to depend on the conditions that exist over the next few weeks.
Whether Democrats hold a majority of House seats when the 120th Congress convenes, per the Clerk of the House’s member list on that date; true if they do, false if they do not.
Whether Mike Johnson is elected Speaker when the 120th Congress convenes in January 2027, per the Clerk of the House’s record of the vote; true if elected, false if not.
Not kept. Canada notified its withdrawal on 15 December 2011, effective a year later, before the period was settled, and emitted significantly more than its target (Shishlov et al., Climate Policy 2016).
Decided by
Canada's average annual greenhouse-gas emissions over 2008–2012 at least 6% below 1990, as settled under the Kyoto Protocol's first-commitment-period review and true-up (ended 18 November 2015).
Met on paper, not at home. Japan's own emissions overshot its allowance; it complied by buying credits — 150 million CERs, 22 million ERUs and 226 million purchased AAUs by end-2013 (Shishlov et al., Climate Policy 2016).
Decided by
Japan's average annual greenhouse-gas emissions over 2008–2012 at least 6% below 1990, as settled under the Kyoto Protocol's first-commitment-period review and true-up (ended 18 November 2015), distinguishing domestic emissions from purchased units.
For October-November-December, the seasonal average Niño 3.4 sea surface temperature anomaly is forecast to reach approximately +3.7°C, peaking around December.
October–December 2026 three-month Niño 3.4 sea-surface temperature anomaly as reported by WMO's El Niño/La Niña Update (cross-checked against NOAA CPC): 'approximately +3.7°C' read as 3.4–4.0°C, and in all cases above the +2.6°C seasonal record of Nov 2015–Jan 2016. Only data for OND 2026 counts.
Copernicus ERA5 monthly global surface air temperature against 1850–1900 for each month October 2026 through January 2027 (the months after the claim): all above 1.5°C. Any month at or below 1.5°C falsifies it.
Employment in office and administrative support occupations is projected to decline 4.0 percent from 2025 to 2035, a loss of 752,100 jobs and the fastest decline of any major occupational group, in part because of AI-powered automation tools; total employment is projected to grow 3.5 percent.
BLS-measured employment in office and administrative support occupations in 2035 against 2025 (projected -4.0%, -752,100), alongside total US employment (projected +3.5%)
While the precise number of jobs that AI may create or displace is uncertain, the technology together with broader economic trends could give rise to 41 million jobs in the United States over the next decade. In our base estimate, automation adoption could reduce labor demand by 21 percent of current work hours, equivalent to about 36 million jobs. For roughly 25 million of these workers, growth in their current occupations could offset the impact of automation, allowing them to stay in the same occupation, although their jobs could change. The remaining 11 million may need to switch occupations entirely.
Net change in total US employment 2025–2035 per BLS (MGI's base case implies demand created exceeds the ~36 million jobs displaced), and the number of workers changing occupation over the decade against MGI's ~11 million (range 6–16 million)
EU sanctions have already cost Russia dearly, depriving Russia's war machine of over EUR 1 trillion ($1.16 trillion) and for autumn I am putting forward the most far-reaching sanctions listings since the start of the war. Once adopted, they would immediately raise the total number of sanctioned Russian entities by a third.
Adopted on October 12 as the largest listings ever: 1,569 targets. The size was understated: the Council puts the total at close to 4,600 after them, so the list grew by about half, not a third. No count of entities alone was published (Council).
Decided by
Whether the EU adopts new Russia sanctions listings — on or after 2026-08-17 and on or before 2026-11-30 — that raise the total number of sanctioned Russian entities by approximately one third, as recorded in the Official Journal of the European Union or the Council's own press releases. Only adoptions dated after the claim count; announcements, Coreper presentations and proposals do not.
Kept. Reflection released Beam's weights on Hugging Face under Apache 2.0, and Artificial Analysis lists them as released on 16 October with that licence — inside the month promised.
Decided by
Whether Beam's model weights are publicly downloadable under an Apache 2.0 licence between 6 October and 31 October 2026, as shown by Reflection AI's own release page or a public model repository.
The drone shot down over Latvia on August 14 entered from Belarus, and Latvia will keep intercepting and destroying drones that violate its airspace — but it does not yet have enough counter-drone systems or radar along its border, and will deploy domestically produced equipment across its entire frontier with Russia and Belarus by the end of September.
Confirmation from Latvia's Ministry of Defence or National Armed Forces that domestically produced counter-drone and radar equipment is deployed along the full length of Latvia's borders with Russia and Belarus, on or before 30 September 2026.
The Texas redistricting effort will for sure yield a two-seat gain, and more than likely yield a three-seat gain. Picking up five seats will be difficult considering the environment and headwinds Republicans face this cycle.
House seats in Texas won by Republicans at the 3 November 2026 general election, per the Texas Secretary of State’s certified results, minus the seats Republicans won there at the November 2024 general election; the claim holds if that net gain is at least two. Scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md.
House seats in Florida won by Republicans at the 3 November 2026 general election, per the Florida Division of Elections’ certified results, minus the seats Republicans won there at the November 2024 general election; the claim holds if that net gain is fewer than four. Scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md.
AAG Dhillon had a cordial meeting with Gov Gordon, the Wyoming Attorney General, and the county clerk for Laramie County. We disagree with the public framing that the two monitors we sent were ‘aggressive’ or did anything improper. The discussion with the Governor and his team was helpful and we look forward to having a presence in Wyoming in the general election.
Whether Justice Department election monitors were present at one or more polling places or election offices in Wyoming during voting in the general election, between 7 October 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026, as established by a department announcement, a Wyoming state or county official on the record, or independent reporting.
2026 as a whole is now on track to end up roughly tied with 2024 as the warmest year on record in ERA5, at 1.6C above preindustrial. And 2027 waiting in the wings to be quite a bit warmer on the back of a record-setting El Nino event.
Calendar-year 2026 global mean surface temperature in ERA5, as published by Copernicus after the year closes (and after 2 October 2026, when the claim was made): about 1.6°C above 1850–1900 and within roughly 0.05°C of 2024’s annual figure. The clause about 2027 is not scored here.
NCEI’s statistical analysis indicates a greater than 99% probability that 2026 will rank among the five warmest years on record, with the highest likelihood favoring the second-warmest year on record.
Rank of calendar-year 2026 in NOAA’s NOAAGlobalTemp annual global surface temperature record, as published by NCEI after the year closes: within the five warmest years (the >99% claim); second-warmest is the outcome named most likely.
Project Jupiter (Doña Ana County, New Mexico) reported complete and operating for Oracle — by county records, company filings or independent reporting published after 24 September 2026 — on or before the resolve date
Infrastructure impact · Commitment · from Infrastructure
resolves by Nov 30, 2026
The two countries established the U.S.-China Super Intelligence (SI) Dialogue to exchange views on risks and benefits related to SI. The next exchange will occur by November 2026.
Whether a US–China government exchange under the dialogue announced on 25–26 September 2026 (the ‘Super Intelligence Dialogue’ in Washington’s account, the ‘AI Dialogue’ in Beijing’s) is held after 26 September 2026 and on or before 30 November 2026, as confirmed by either government’s published readout
Given the accelerating rate of AI capability development, it’s my worry that in 6–12 months such a swarm could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet (potentially causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage), and that the scale of damage would continue to increase from there if AI becomes more powerful without the necessary guardrails.
Between 12 September 2026 and 12 September 2027, a government body or independent security researchers document a swarm of AI agents operating, or demonstrated capable of operating, a persistent self-propagating botnet at internet scale. Only events after 12 September 2026 count.
The AI investment boom has accounted for nearly half of S&P 500 earnings growth this year, and this tailwind should begin to fade next year even as capex spending continues to grow.
The share of S&P 500 earnings growth attributable to AI investment in calendar 2027 compared with calendar 2026, on Goldman Sachs’s own or a comparable strategist’s published decomposition, in a year when aggregate hyperscaler capital expenditure still rises
I think that in the next upcoming weeks, we can hopefully see the results from these companies. So I would say that maybe in four to eight weeks, we should see we are more controlling the air again.
Share of Russian jet-powered attack drones shot down, as stated by Ukraine's president or Air Force for any period between 1 October and 26 November 2026, compared with the 57 percent stated on 28 September 2026
Russia is ready to increase diesel supplies in October, and exports are expected to rise in November and December as refineries resume operations after maintenance.
Russian seaborne diesel exports in November 2026 and in December 2026, as measured by a ship-tracking or energy-market body (Kpler, the IEA, or loading data reported by Reuters or Bloomberg), each compared with October 2026. The claim holds if both months are higher than October.
We believe that in 2026 we will reach an equal amount of Ukrainian territory temporarily occupied by the Russians and liberated by us. As of now, 990 square kilometres have been occupied since the start of the year, and on 820 square kilometres we have restored control. But by the end of 2026 we are reaching a parity number of kilometres.
Area of Ukraine seized by Russian forces versus area liberated by Ukrainian forces over calendar 2026 (1 January to 31 December), on ISW’s assessed figures with DeepState’s as the comparison; the claim holds if liberated is equal to or greater than seized.
The TL;DR version is that there is a range of plausible Democratic margins—between about 8 and 14 points—that come from defensible data choices. The 16-point Democratic margin comes from a mix of assumptions that all push the result in Democrats’ favor and that should probably be discounted. This is still an uncomfortably wide range.
National House popular-vote margin (Democratic minus Republican) in the 2026-11-03 general election, from certified returns as compiled by the Clerk of the House, against the stated range of 8 to 14 points; scored as a stated range by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md.
A Supreme Court decision on AI training and copyright is essentially inevitable, with some publishers settling but enough litigating to force resolution of the novel question.
A U.S. Supreme Court merits decision squarely resolving whether unlicensed use of copyrighted works to train generative AI is copyright infringement or fair use.
In most cases it will likely be illegal to copy copyrighted works to train generative AI without permission, because AI trained on those works can generate countless competing works and thereby dilute the market for the originals — so companies will generally need to pay for training rights.
The prevailing outcome in US courts of AI-training fair-use disputes: whether unlicensed copying of copyrighted works to train generative AI is generally held to be infringement (requiring licensing) rather than fair use.
We intend to seek review by the Supreme Court to obtain much-needed clarity on these issues, which carry significant implications for innovation and the development of AI technologies.
A petition for a writ of certiorari from the Third Circuit’s judgment in Thomson Reuters v. ROSS Intelligence (No. 25-2153), docketed at the US Supreme Court (supremecourt.gov) after 2 October 2026 and on or before the resolve date.
Lag in months between the best open-weight and best closed model at equivalent score on the Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index (or successor independent index)
The taskforce, which is expected to complete its work by the end of the year, will also recommend practical steps AI companies can take to reduce the risk of similar incidents.
Between 28 September and 31 December 2026, OpenAI or the Australian government publicly reports that the taskforce OpenAI promised has completed its work and issued recommendations.
While the exact magnitude and mix of future debt issuance from the hyperscalers is uncertain, our review of management commentary leaves us expecting a growing role for debt financing in the AI buildout in the years ahead.
Whether investment-grade bond issuance by the five largest AI spenders reaches roughly $250 billion in 2026 and $400 billion in 2027, and whether debt-funded capital expenditure passes a third of the total
We have clear intelligence that Russia is preparing a new and quite significant wave of mobilization for the fall. Currently, the Russians are losing more troops on the front than they are recruiting.
Whether Russia announces a formal wave of mobilization or involuntary reserve call-ups — a presidential decree or an equivalent published instrument, not a recruitment drive or an end-strength adjustment — on or before 2026-11-30, as reported by wire services or published on pravo.gov.ru.
The Kremlin is preparing to mobilise around 300,000 servicemembers after the September 18–20 State Duma elections, in part to reinforce Russian positions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
A formal Russian mobilisation decision or publicly announced wave of approximately 300,000 or more servicemembers, taken between 2026-09-21 and 2026-12-31. Bounded at both ends: decisions before the Duma elections, or after 2026, do not count.
Russian forces may continue to make slow creeping advances in the Fortress Belt but will fail to meet Putin’s newly revised deadline of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by Spring 2027, if they can seize it at all.
Whether Russian forces control the full administrative territory of Donetsk Oblast, as assessed by ISW and DeepState control mapping, at any point between 8 October 2026 and 31 May 2027.
ICE is not planning operations targeting polling locations. ICE conducts intelligence-driven targeted enforcement, and if an active public safety threat endangered a polling location, they may be arrested as a result of that targeted enforcement action.
Whether ICE conducted an operation targeting a polling location, or stationed officers at one, between 2 October 2026 and the close of polls on 3 November 2026, as established by a court record, an official statement or independent reporting from at least two outlets. An arrest of a named individual made away from a polling place does not count; an operation at or directed at one does.
Net change in House seats held by Democrats between the 2024 general election result and the certified 2026 general election result, per the Clerk of the House; the claim holds if the net Democratic gain is fewer than 40 seats. Scored by the rule in us-midterms-2026/_skills/research-brief.md.
US average retail electricity price for all sectors, as published by the EIA, lower than the same month a year earlier at any point before 31 December 2027
Progress has been made toward a permanent US Army base in Poland, which currently hosts American troops only on a rotational basis: ‘If this happens, the location will be announced very soon. This will be a historic step for our Great U.S./Polish Alliance.’
A specific location for a permanent (not rotational) US Army installation in Poland, named on the record by the US or Polish government, after September 17, 2026
The Russian offensive campaign will culminate in September 2026; Russian forces will shift to mechanized breakthrough tactics by October, reinforcing roughly 200-strong assault units with columns of about 50 armoured vehicles; and Russia will try to seize at least one Fortress Belt settlement by the end of its autumn campaign.
Whether ISW confirms, after 11 September 2026, (a) Russian mechanized assaults of roughly battalion scale on the Fortress Belt axes, and (b) the confirmed seizure of any Fortress Belt settlement — Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk or Slovyansk
it's past time for us to define standards for when and how we share misalignment incidents, not just misalignment properties of our models. […] We and the larger AI community do not yet have a clear standard for how to report misalignment that shows up during training, evaluation, and deployment, including examples that don't look like traditional security incidents but could provide insight into AI behavior and future risks. We're working on a framework and will share it in upcoming weeks, and in parallel we're working with dozens of government regulatory agencies worldwide on these issues.
Delivered early. OpenAI published ‘Our framework for reporting model misalignment’ on September 16, six weeks before the deadline, with six incident reports alongside it. The metric asked for a framework stating when and how OpenAI discloses; one exists. What it does not contain is a trigger — see the September 16 entries.
Decided by
OpenAI publishes a framework stating when and how it discloses misalignment incidents arising in training, evaluation or deployment.
We expect the war will continue — Ukraine is counting on US energy and air-defence support this winter, and does not expect an increase in Patriot supplies until next year.
Whether active hostilities between Russia and Ukraine are still under way on 2026-12-31 — no ceasefire or peace agreement in effect between the two governments — as reported by wire services or confirmed by either government.
Combined 2026 growth in Chinese generation from wind, solar, nuclear and hydro at least equalling the 2026 growth in total electricity generation, per National Bureau of Statistics and China Electricity Council annual data.
In 2027, we have secured the supply to again double AI revenue to approximately $115 billion. Our demand actually exceeds this outlook, and we will work to improve supply. In 2028, we expect the trajectory of growth to continue. We have line of sight for fiscal 2028 AI semiconductor revenue growth to again double to $230 billion.
Broadcom's reported AI semiconductor revenue for fiscal 2027, as stated in its own fourth-quarter and full-year results. Resolves true if it reaches approximately $115bn (a band of $109bn-$121bn, +/-5%), false if it falls short of $109bn.
Serhiy 'Flash' Beskrestnov, Ukraine's presidential adviser on defence technologies, said Russia's next step is a cheap jet-powered missile — the Geran-5, Banderol, Dan-T, Dan-M and the jet UMPB-5R glide bomb — pushing speeds from the Geran-4's 300-500 km/h up to 500-650 km/h: 'That is effectively a missile, and it will be very hard for an interceptor to work against such a target.'
Documented cruise speeds of Russian jet-powered one-way attack munitions (Geran-5, Banderol, Dan-T/M, UMPB-5R) in Ukrainian Air Force reporting or specialist analytical assessment reaching 500-650 km/h
Russia's political leadership has ordered its forces to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by 31 December 2026; the military leadership replied that the order was unrealistic and asked for 31 March 2027 instead. Neither date is achievable given the battlefield situation.
Whether Russian forces control the full administrative territory of both Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as assessed by ISW and DeepState control mapping, on 31 December 2026.
El Niño will strengthen to a very strong event peaking towards the end of 2026, and forecasts put at nearly 100 percent the likelihood it persists through February 2027.
Peak three-month Oceanic Niño Index reaching the very-strong threshold (2.0°C or higher) and continuous El Niño conditions persisting through February 2027, per NOAA CPC / WMO ENSO monitoring.
The Russian General Staff has prepared a scenario for the additional mobilisation of 600,000 people across 2026 and 2027 — 300,000 in each year — chiefly to bring units fighting Ukraine up to strength; Putin will most likely decide after the 18–20 September State Duma elections.
A formal Russian mobilisation decision or announced wave totalling approximately 600,000 or more, taken across calendar 2026 and 2027 combined. Bounded at both ends: decisions before 2026-08-27, the date of the claim, do not count, and the count closes 2027-12-31. Distinct from the 2026-08-23 forecast of ~300,000 after the September elections — a single 300,000 announcement resolves that one and not this one.
Revenue for the third quarter of fiscal 2027 is expected to be $108.0 billion, plus or minus 2 percent, with no Data Center compute revenue from China assumed.
NVIDIA's reported revenue for the third quarter of fiscal 2027, as published in its own results release. Resolves true if reported revenue falls within $105.84bn-$110.16bn (the stated ±2% band), false if outside it.
Russia could ask North Korea to provide up to 50,000 additional troops during a potential September meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
A publicly confirmed North Korean commitment to deploy approximately 50,000 or more additional troops to Russia, agreed or announced between 2026-09-01 and 2026-12-31. Confirmation means a statement by either government or a Western intelligence assessment; a Ukrainian intelligence claim alone does not resolve it.
A negotiated agreement ending the Russia-Ukraine war — a ceasefire or peace settlement signed by both Russia and Ukraine — concluded between 2026-11-01 and 2027-09-30. Bounded at both ends: agreements before the window, or after it, do not count.
Aggregate US hyperscaler investment-grade bond issuance between 2026-08-20 and 2027-08-20, measured from a market tracker such as SIFMA, LSEG or Bloomberg league tables. Bounded at both ends; issuance before or after the window does not count.
The earth is warmer in 1988 than at any time in the history of instrumental measurements... With about 99 percent confidence we can state that the warming during this time period is a real warming trend... In my opinion, the greenhouse effect has been detected, and it is changing our climate now.
Detection vindicated: the 1980s warming was real and human-caused, as every later assessment confirmed. His intermediate Scenario B ran a little hot — observed warming tracked close to but somewhat below it, about 30% slower over 1970–2016 than Scenario B projected, mainly because the model's 4.2°C sensitivity was high and the halocarbons it assumed kept growing were later cut by the Montreal Protocol (Carbon Brief/Hausfather).
Decided by
Whether subsequent decades confirmed the 1980s warming Hansen ascribed to the greenhouse effect as a real, sustained human-caused trend, and the magnitude of his intermediate Scenario B trajectory against observed global temperature.
Given the estimated trend and the volume estimate for October–November of 2007 at less than 9,000 km3, one can project that at this rate it would take only 9 more years or until 2016 ± 3 years to reach a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean in summer. Regardless of high uncertainty associated with such an estimate, it does provide a lower bound of the time range for projections of seasonal sea ice cover.
False. Nothing close has happened: NSIDC put the September 2025 minimum at 4.60m sq km, tenth lowest in the satellite record and still more than four times the 1m sq km “ice-free” threshold. The projection was offered as a hedged lower bound rather than a central estimate — a caveat the coverage of it did not always carry.
Decided by
Whether the Arctic September sea-ice minimum falls below the 1 million sq km “ice-free” threshold in any year through 2019, per NSIDC.
False by a factor of about 4.7: September 2015 ended with 4.6m sq km of ice, the fourth lowest on record at the time. The forecast was filed formally with the Sea Ice Prediction Network, but the method behind it was never published.
Decided by
Observed September 2015 Arctic sea-ice extent, per the Sea Ice Prediction Network / NSIDC record.
False, and in the direction the outlook was criticised for at the time: renewables passed coal in 2025, supplying 33.8% of world electricity against coal’s 33.0%, at least five years before the projected window opened. The figure came from a central scenario that assumed governments would miss many of their own clean-energy targets.
Decided by
The first calendar year in which renewables exceed coal as a share of global electricity generation, per Ember / IEA full-year data.
Next year or the year after that, I think it will be free of ice in summer and by that I mean the central Arctic will be ice-free. You will be able to cross over the north pole by ship.
False. Nine summers on the central Arctic is still frozen: NSIDC recorded a September 2025 minimum of 4.60m sq km, tenth lowest in the satellite record. When the claim was made, none of the 40 groups filing with the Sea Ice Prediction Network expected even a record low that year.
Decided by
Whether the Arctic September sea-ice minimum falls below the 1 million sq km “ice-free” threshold in 2017 or 2018, per NSIDC.
Whether the assessed long-term human-induced warming level exceeds 1.5°C above 1850–1900 by the end of 2030, per IPCC/WMO assessment rather than any single calendar year.
Graphics memory costs will rise further and substantially increase graphics card costs in the second half of the year, with entry-level cards facing more severe shortages and availability declining further.
Whether NVIDIA discloses a Trigger Event under the PORTS-Pike residual value guaranties — OpenAI insolvency causing a lease default, or OpenAI's failure to make lease payments, as defined in the 17 August 2026 Form 8-K — in any SEC filing between the first lease commencement (expected 2028) and 31 December 2030
The SEC's position lets sponsors of data-centre securitisations hold progressively less of their own equity in these deals, and will push the industry toward more of them.
Whether data-centre securitisation issuance in 2027 exceeds its 2026 level, and whether sponsors' retained equity in new deals falls below the 5% risk-retention floor that applied before the SEC staff's position
Whether the January 2026 case-by-case export framework proves enforceable (its 50%-cap, end-use, and third-party-lab conditions hold) or leaks/expands toward more capable chips
With CO₂ emissions still increasing, keeping global warming below 1.5°C is no longer plausible; the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C — about 170 billion tonnes of CO₂ — will be gone before 2030 at the current emission rate.
Whether cumulative global CO₂ emissions (fossil + land-use, per the annual Global Carbon Budget) from 1 Jan 2025 exceed 170 Gt CO₂ before 1 Jan 2030 — i.e. the stated 1.5°C budget is exhausted this decade.
2026 will finish around 1.51°C above pre-industrial levels — the second-warmest calendar year on record behind 2024 — with a 35% chance of setting a new annual record and a 63% chance of exceeding 1.5°C.
2026 calendar-year global mean surface temperature anomaly vs 1850–1900, six-dataset mean (NASA, NOAA, HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, ERA5, JRA-3Q): central sub-claim resolves if 2026 lands 1.45–1.57°C and second-warmest; the record sub-claim resolves on whether 2026 exceeds 2024.
2027 will be around 1.7°C above pre-industrial levels, comfortably setting a new record for the warmest year, as the developing El Niño has its largest impact that year.
2027 calendar-year global mean surface temperature anomaly vs 1850–1900, six-dataset mean: resolves true if 2027 exceeds the prior record (2024, ~1.52°C) and lands near 1.7°C.
Named investors called AI-era markets a bubble: Ray Dalio saw 'classic signs' of one reminiscent of 1929 and 2000 and agreed with Jeremy Grantham that this is 'the biggest investment bubble in American history'; Goldman Sachs's Peter Oppenheimer partly dissented — 'there does not appear to be a valuation bubble … there may be an earnings bubble' — while Apollo's Torsten Slok declared 'the 60/40 portfolio is broken.'
Whether the AI-era equity-issuance surge marks a market top comparable to 1929 and 2000 — tracked against the IPO calendar (SpaceX's post-IPO share price, and the pricing and aftermarket performance of the Anthropic and OpenAI roughly $1 trillion listings) rather than a fixed deadline
Whether a signed licence or production contract for Ukrainian manufacture of Patriot-family interceptors or their components is confirmed by RTX/Raytheon, the US State Department or the US Department of Defense, and whether any such interceptor or component is manufactured in Ukraine — evidenced by a company or US government release, or a Ukrainian government production announcement corroborated by a wire service.
Geopolitics and war · Commitment · from Air Defence
resolves by Nov 30, 2026
Trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, the United States and Russia will be held in the autumn of 2026 — though if the timing were up to me they would happen in July.
Whether a negotiating session with official delegations from all three of Ukraine, the United States and Russia convenes on or before 2026-11-30, as reported by wire services or confirmed by any of the three governments.
Electricity bills for American families will actually come down. They're going to have a lot of electricity left over, and they'll put that into the grid.
Data-centre load left in PJM's capacity auctions has increased capacity costs by $29.4 billion over the last four auctions, and that number will accelerate in future auctions if PJM succeeds in increasing the maximum price in the auctions.
Capacity charges in PJM auctions attributable to data-centre demand, as calculated by Monitoring Analytics, for auctions held after July 2026 compared with the four preceding auctions.
Whether selling China throttled U.S. chips (H20-class) keeps Chinese AI developers dependent on the American stack, versus accelerating adoption of domestic alternatives (e.g. Huawei Ascend)
I hereby announce that in the next five years, China will provide developing countries with 5,000 opportunities in AI training and seminar programs; develop international AI application cooperation centers with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS; and enable 30 countries to use the AI-powered meteorological warning system, or MAZU, to safeguard homes around the world.
Whether, by July 2031, Chinese ministry records and recipient-government announcements show 5,000 AI training and seminar places delivered to developing countries, AI application cooperation centres established with all six named regional blocs, and the MAZU meteorological warning system in operational use in 30 countries
Our internal belief is that by March of 2028 we may have a significant fraction of our research being done by AI systems in tandem with our own researchers.
Whether, by 31 March 2028, OpenAI or a credible independent account describes a substantial and named share of OpenAI's research work as being performed by AI systems working alongside its researchers. OpenAI defines no threshold for 'a significant fraction', so the charitable reading applied at resolution is a share OpenAI itself characterises as significant, in a dated public statement, with the work identified — not a capability demonstration and not a further projection.
Whether hyperscaler earnings are shown (via restatements, SEC action, or realized impairments) to have been overstated by understated depreciation — Burry's specific ~$176B / Oracle ~27% / Meta ~21% by 2028
Even as we invest to meet growing demand, full fiscal year operating margins should be down less than a point. In addition, we expect to remain free cash flow positive in FY27.
Whether Microsoft reports positive free cash flow for its fiscal year ending 30 June 2027, on its own definition, while capital expenditure grows year over year
Returns on AI capital · Commitment · from The Money
resolves by Dec 31, 2027
Heavy capital spending relative to revenue will lead to declining, and in some cases negative, free cash flow and will hurt leverage ratios, to the extent these expenditures are debt-financed.
Google will replenish more water than it consumes across its data-center sites by 2030, and U.S. data centers in aggregate use less than 1% of the nation’s water.
Google's replenishment pledge is a forward commitment (unresolved). The aggregate "less than 1%" framing is broadly consistent with national estimates but sits in tension with primary local records — e.g. Google's own quintupled draw at The Dalles reaching ~40% of that city's supply — where impacts concentrate. True in aggregate, misleading locally. This cycle adds a second problem with the aggregate framing rather than the local one: the standard operational metric, Water Usage Effectiveness, counts neither the potable-versus-reclaimed distinction nor the water consumed generating the electricity, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory puts that indirect footprint at nearly 800 billion litres for 2023 against 66 billion litres of direct on-site water — roughly twelve times larger. LBNL separately states its own water model may run low, and that correcting one cooling assumption would lift modelled hyperscale water intensity by about a quarter. Verdict held at mixed.
Decided by
Google replenishes more freshwater than it consumes across its data-center sites
Infrastructure impact · Commitment · from Infrastructure
resolves by Dec 31, 2032
Electricity rates will not go up for residents because of this project. Georgia families will not subsidize this project.
You are the first leader I have welcomed in person since taking office, and that is no accident. It is intended to send a very clear message: we are with Ukraine 100%, I am personally with you 100%, and I will honor every commitment this country has made to Ukraine in full.
Published UK government (MoD/HM Treasury) figures for military support to Ukraine covering the 2026-27 and 2027-28 financial years, cross-checked against the Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker: the pledge holds if UK military support is sustained at £3bn a year or above and the 2024 UK-Ukraine Agreement on Security Co-operation remains in force.
Whether roughly $500 billion of two-way business between Nvidia and SK Group is realised in Nvidia's filed revenue and component purchases and SK Group's disclosures
Returns on AI capital · Commitment · from The Money
resolves by Dec 31, 2030
AI is likely to replace half of all white-collar workers in the U.S.
Number of IBM back-office/HR roles left unbackfilled and attributable to AI/automation over 2023–2028, per IBM disclosure or credible reporting (Krishna's ~7,800 figure).
my basic prediction is that AI-enabled biology and medicine will allow us to compress the progress that human biologists would have achieved over the next 50-100 years into 5-10 years.
Documented biomedical R&D progress (major disease cures/therapeutics, longevity gains) attributable to AI equivalent to 50–100 years of prior-rate advancement, achieved within 5–10 years of ‘powerful AI.’
If the ~7-month doubling of the task-completion horizon holds, AI agents will be able to complete many software/engineering tasks that currently take humans days or weeks — reaching roughly month-long autonomous tasks — within the decade.
The 50%-reliability task-completion time-horizon of the frontier model on METR’s public time-horizons tracker reaching ~1 month (≈160 human work-hours).
That is capitalism. We're going to have some big winners and we're going to have some big losers ... but if you have a diversified portfolio, you're going to be fine.
OpenAI is on track to generate more than $20 billion in annualized revenue run rate this year, with plans to grow to hundreds of billions in sales by 2030.
Still mixed. The exit-month run rate did cross $20 billion, but audited 2025 GAAP revenue was $13.07 billion, so the framing overstates realised revenue. The 2030 limb remains open and is now trending: the run rate passed $40 billion by August 2026, roughly double the end-2025 pace.
Decided by
OpenAI reported (GAAP) annual revenue reaching 'hundreds of billions' by 2030
The U.S. is doubling down on restricting sales of chips to China and purchases from China, but models like Qwen 3 that are state-of-the-art and open […] will undoubtedly be used domestically. It reflects the reality that businesses are both building their own tools [as well as] buying off the shelf via closed-model companies like Anthropic and OpenAI.
Confirmed by mid-2026: CNBC reported Western companies increasingly adopting Chinese open-weight models on cost grounds, and OpenRouter token-traffic data showed GLM-5.2 usage climbing faster post-launch than any predecessor — Chinese open models are in production US use at scale.
Decided by
Documented US enterprise adoption of Chinese open-weight models (hosting-platform traffic shares, credible adoption reporting)