Chapter 1
The Ukraine-Russia war is fought in two places at once
The Ukraine-Russia war is fought in two places at once, and only one of them is the front. Along the contact line, drones have made massed armour expensive and ground changes hands one settlement at a time. In the stalemate that produced, a second war has grown up at ranges the front never reaches. Each side is trying to break something far behind the other’s lines: Ukraine the refining, aviation and logistics that fund and supply Russia’s war, Russia the power, heat and industry that keep Ukraine running. Neither campaign has moved the front. Both have escalated anyway, and each now has effects that people with no stake in the other side’s claims can measure.
Chapter 2
Ukraine’s campaign is made of cheap long-range drones launched in mass
Ukraine’s campaign is made of cheap long-range drones launched in mass, which buys reach rather than weight of fire. Its strikes have been confirmed near Tyumen, about 1,980 kilometres from the front, at Omsk, about 2,500 kilometres out, and in October 2026 near Surgut in Khanty-Mansi, about 2,340 kilometres from the border. Because a drone cannot flatten a refinery, the campaign has moved through target sets instead, each narrower than the last: refineries and oil depots, the substations that feed them, an online retailer’s warehouses, airbases and the plants behind Russia’s missiles, data centres, and now the single processing units inside a plant that are hardest to replace, struck again before repairs finish. Its largest strike on St Petersburg, in October 2026, about 850 kilometres from the border, added the city’s oil export terminal and its bridges to the list. Later that month, as refinery strikes stopped after Washington announced an energy truce, the drones turned to chemical and steel plants: synthetic-rubber works at Omsk and Tolyatti, nitrogen plants at Berezniki and Novomoskovsk, and the Novolipetsk steelworks. Its heaviest civilian toll on Russian soil came in August 2026, when the strike on the TANECO refinery at Nizhnekamsk killed at least thirteen, including a child.
Chapter 3
Russia’s campaign is the inverse: ballistic and cruise missiles fired…
Russia’s campaign is the inverse: ballistic and cruise missiles fired in packages of dozens alongside hundreds of drones, weight rather than reach. Its target has narrowed from cities in general to the system that keeps them lit and heated. In late September 2026 it opened its largest attack on Ukraine’s power system since spring; on October 8 one strike cut power to more than three million people in Kyiv; on October 13–14 thirty-nine ballistic missiles went at Kyiv’s three heating plants and the Air Force said it stopped four; and on October 16–17 the strikes reached energy sites in ten oblasts, from Kharkiv in the east to Volyn in the west, and added steel plants and foreign-owned factories to the list. Ukraine stopped regularly publishing how many missiles it faces and stops in August 2026, so the most dangerous part of each package is also the least measured.
Chapter 4
What each campaign has achieved shows up first where neither side aimed
What each campaign has achieved shows up first where neither side aimed. Kazakhstan, not a party to the war, saw its daily oil and condensate output more than halve after strikes closed the export terminal it depends on. Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer, put its losses from strikes on its warehouses at up to 4.82 billion dollars, with nothing insured. Then the independent measurers arrived. In September 2026 the International Energy Agency put Russian refinery throughput at 3.8 million barrels a day in June, the lowest in more than twenty years, with only five of thirty-two major refineries never struck. Individual halts are now reported plant by plant by industry sources: every big Lukoil refinery shut at once in late August, Yaroslavl losing about 40 per cent of its capacity in September, a main crude unit at Ryazan in October.
Chapter 5
In October 2026 the two campaigns briefly met in diplomacy
In October 2026 the two campaigns briefly met in diplomacy. Donald Trump announced an energy ceasefire on October 11. Neither government had recognised it, and Russia kept striking the grid; Ukraine held off Russian energy targets for three days by its own and others’ accounts, then struck Ryazan on October 15 and said the pause was over. When the refinery strikes stopped in the second half of October, Russian refineries raised their crude processing by a quarter, according to industry sources cited by Reuters. What remains unresolved is whether Russia’s refining losses are durable or quickly repaired; whether Russia can wreck Ukraine’s grid and heating faster than they are repaired before winter, while Ukraine’s interceptors run short; how much of Ukraine’s generation is destroyed rather than damaged — its energy minister puts the two together at more than 80 per cent; and whether either campaign, having failed to move the front, can end the war by other means.
And now
Ukraine’s long-range drones have moved from Russia’s refineries to its chemical and steel plants, and Russia has turned its missiles on Ukraine’s bridges and railways.
No Ukrainian strike on a Russian refinery has been reported since October 16. Zelensky says he held off them after Trump announced an energy truce on October 11, and Russian refineries raised crude processing by a quarter in the second half of October, sources told Reuters. Instead, footage geolocated by ISW shows fires at synthetic-rubber plants in Omsk and Tolyatti on October 24, and at a nitrogen plant in Novomoskovsk and the Novolipetsk steelworks, Russia’s largest, on October 28. Local officials conceded industrial damage without naming the plants; Lipetsk’s governor denied the steelworks fire. Strikes on October 23–24 cut power across occupied Crimea, which Russia’s energy ministry acknowledged, and Yandex says it has moved its supercomputers after strikes on its data centres.
On October 26–27 Russian ballistic missiles closed Kyiv’s Southern Bridge to cars and trains; Zelensky counted 16 missiles that night and more than 100 at Kyiv since October 14. On October 29 a drone hit a crowded platform at Dnipro’s main station, killing at least 14.
Where it stands today →